Making Democracy Work
Robert D. Putnam  
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Maison d'édition:Princeton University Press
Genre:Sociologie
Pages:286
ASIN:0691078890
ISBN:9780691078892
Dewey:306.20945
Format:Hardcover
Date de parution:1992-12-15
Dimensions:1.00 x 9.30 x 6.30 in
Date de l'ajout:2010-09-03
Prix:CDN$ 95.00
Appréciation:4.0 (5 voix)
Résumé: It's unfortunate that given the opportunity and resources to study the birth and development of regional government in Italy over the course of twenty years, the best conclusions Putnam was able to draw from his observations are hackneyed paraphrases from Tocqueville. Most of his most careful fieldwork yields results that are stultifyingly obvious; and it's hard not to think that his questions and indicators were not deliberately chosen to demonstrate foregone conclusions. Probably most irritating to me is Putnam's irresponsible use of history as a tool for proving continuities that are largely imaginary.
That said, Making Democracy Work is not a boring read, and its flaws at least encourage the reader to contemplate the million ways the book and the study it describes might have been better.
Beginning in 1977, Putnam and his colleagues studied the performance and reception of the 15 regional governments that had been first established in 1970. Given pre-existing disparities among the regions -- economic, cultural, political, demographic, nevermind linguistic and geographic -- it's little surprise that the researchers found that not all the regional governments developed the same way. While he found that the 'institutional socialization' of the new parliamentary bodies had a consistently positive effect on the regional politicians' growing professionalism and willingness to explore constructive compromises with ideological opponents, the governments were not uniformly effective or responsive, nor were their constituents uniformly happy with their efforts.
Ruling out economics as a determining factor in these disparities (through a series of statistical negotiations that show an appalling lack of understanding about basic economics), and drawing heavily from Tocqueville's ideas about the mystical cultural underpinnings for successful democracy, Putnam constructed a 'civic community index' -- a list of indicators including newspaper readership, membership in associations, and what might be called 'enlightened' (abstract, issue-oriented) versus 'parochial' (personal) voting patterns. Again, it's small surprise that he finds a close correlation between the regions' scores on this index and their constituents' relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their regional governments.
Trying to explain why this might be so, Putnam then launches into a heavily simplified -- at times almost fanciful -- exposition of 1,000 years of Italian history in which somehow economic development patterns, demographics, religious institutions, and systems of political organization experience enormous changes while cultural traditions of 'civic-ness' remain more or less consistent, wonderfully cohering to the boundaries described by the modern regions and their scores on Putnam's civic community index. He concludes that habits die hard -- whether these be 'good' habits of mutual trust and social reciprocity or 'bad' habits of atomistic self-interest and traditionalist dependency -- and that the effects of institutional change on social and cultural norms is gradual, perhaps so gradual as to be almost imperceptible within a single lifetime.
Stopping just a hair's breadth short of claiming that culture determines economic and political success in the modern world, Putnam does the next worst thing, which is to give credit for present-day disparities in wealth and power to 'historical trends' in cultural development that don't bear close examination by anyone even slightly familiar with Italian history. For example, given Putnam's assessment of the disparity between North/Central Italy (very civic) and the 'amoral' South (terribly un-civic), the first with its innovative and republican cultural of mutual trust and democracy, the second with its stubbornly backward vertical social hierarchies, one could be forgiven for imagining that the South must certainly have been the base of support for Italian fascism in the 30s and 40s -- while in fact it was the gloriously civic-minded North that provided Mussolini with his most consistent support.
On the surface, there's nothing wrong with Putnam's basic political belief -- that democracy is strongest when it's built on a foundation of social reciprocity and trust, civic engagement, etc. My criticism shouldn't be taken as a condemnation of efforts to build or strengthen civil society, or to promote participatory democracy -- far from it! The trouble with Putnam's argument is its methodology, and the pernicious cultural determinism that lurks behind his rhetoric about path-dependent history.